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NOTES
VIRGINIA'S DOMESTIC RELATIONS LONG-ARM
LEGISLATION: DOES ITS REACH EXCEED ITS DUE
PROCESS GRASP
Virginia recently enacted long-arm legislation authorizing per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in certain spousal
support, child support, separate maintenance, and divorce suits.1
The Commonwealth first enacted a domestic relations long-arm
statute in 1978,2 which the General Assembly amended in 1982.3 A
second domestic relations long-arm statute was enacted in 19814
and amended m 1982;5 this statute increased substantially the
1. In the 1983 session of the Virginia Assembly, Delegate Mary Sue Terry of the Twelfth
District of Virginia will introduce an amendment to Virginia's domestic relations long-arm
statutes substantially similar to the amendment proposed in this Note, supra text accompa-
nying note 137. See H.B. 49, Va. Assembly (1983). See also Letter from Mary Sue Terry,
Delegate, Virginia General Assembly, to Doug Rendleman, Professor of Law, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary (Aug. 27, 1982). Adoption of this
amendment would transform Virginia's domestic relations long-arm statutes into model leg-
islation for all states.
2. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(8) (1977 & Supp. 1981). This statute permits a Virginia court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in actions arising from that person's
having been ordered to pay spousal or child support in a Virginia divorce suit in wlch the
court exercised personal jurisdiction.
3. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(8) (1977 & Supp. 1982). See infra text accompanying note
109. The 1982 amendment authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents who have executed
agreements in Virginia obligating them to pay spousal or child support either to a domicili-
ary of Virginia or to a resident of Virginia complying with certain statutory requirements.
For an analysis of this statute, see infra notes 109-33 and accompanying text.
4. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(9) (1977 & Supp. 1981). This statute allows a Virginia court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over certain nonresidents in divorce proceedings.
5. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(9) (1977 & Supp. 1982). The 1982 amendment changes only
the language and not the substance of this long-arm statute. The statute authorizes Virginia
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in causes of action arising from
that person's
[h]aving maintained within this Commonwealth a matrimonial domicile at the
time of separation of the parties upon which grounds for divorce or separate
maintenance is based, or at the time a cause of action arose for divorce or
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scope of personal jurisdiction that Virginia courts can exercise over
nonresident litigants in domestic relations suits.
Prior to the passage of these long-arm statutes, the permissible
scope of state court jurisdiction over nonresidents was expanding
pursuant to a nationwide judicial trend.' This trend seemed to her-
ald the eventual demise of all restrictions on state court jurisdic-
tion.7 Recent United States Supreme Court decisions, however,
curtailed this trend8 by heightening the jurisdictional hurdle that
state courts must overcome to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents.9 Consequently, states must be sensitive not to exceed
due process limits in formulating new long-arm legislation. Addi-
tionally, existing long-arm statutes should be examined to ensure
that they comply with due process limitations described in recent
Supreme Court opinions.
This Note examines Virginia's domestic relations long-arm stat-
utes in light of due process requirements. First, the Note examines
the special policy considerations highlighting the need for domestic
relations long-arm statutes. Next, recent Supreme Court jurisdic-
tional decisions are examined to identify due process principles re-
stricting a state's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants. Finally, Virginia's statutes are analyzed
against this backdrop of policy and due process, both to determine
separate maintenance or at the time of commencement of such suit, if the
other party to the matrimomal relationship resides hereto; provided that proof
of service of process m person on the nonresident party is obtained. Service of
process under this paragraph may be made by a law-enforcement officer au-
thorized to serve process in the jurisdiction where the nonresident party is
located.
Id.
6. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court noted that "the re-
quirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of
Pennoyer v. Neff to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash-
ington " Id. at 251. The Court continued this judicial expansion of due process in
decisions following International Shoe. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
7. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
8. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
9. See generally Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Family Law Cases, 32 Sw.
L.J. 965, 966 (1978).
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their validity and to suggest modifications. This Note concludes
that the reach of Virginia's long-arm statutes does not exceed their
due process grasp. Recent precedent, however, indicates that the
statutes' specific enumeration of circumstances in which the Com-
monwealth is authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction may con-
strain, contrary to legislative intent, the reach of these statutes.10
The Virginia Assembly, therefore, should amend these statutes To
ensure their judicial application to the full extent permissible com-
mensurate with due process principles.11
THE NEED FOR DOMESTIC RELATIONS LONG-ARM LEGISLATION
Judicial and Legislative Policies Highlighting the Need for
Personal Junsdiction Over the Nonresident Spouse
In Williams v. North Carolina,2 the United States Supreme
Court held that a valid divorce can be granted by a court in the
state where either spouse is domiciled."$ By providing a domicile to
either spouse, a state may grant a binding divorce decree even
though the other spouse is absent from the state and not subject to
its personal jurisdiction. Despite the ability of a state court to
grant a divorce based on personal jurisdiction over only one
spouse, compelling judicial and legislative policies illustrate the
10. See tnfra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 1.
12. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams 1). In Williams I, the petitioners, domiciled in North
Carolina, left their respective spouses in that state, obtained divorces and married each
other in Nevada, and returned to live in North Carolina. Id. at 289-90. Convicted by North
Carolina of bigamous cohabitation, the petitioners claimed that the Nevada divorces were
valid. Id. at 290-91. The United States Supreme Court held that if a divorce decree is valid
in the state where granted to one domiciled therein, and is rendered according to due pro-
cess principles, that decree is binding upon other states. Id. at 299.
13. The Court in Williams I said:
Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital
status of persons domiciled within its borders. The marriage relation creates
problems of large social importance. Protection of offspring, property interests,
and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of commanding
problems in the field of domestic relations with which the state must deal.
Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries
and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its own
borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the
other spouse is absent.
Id. at 289-99.
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need for state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over both
spouses in domestic relations litigation.
14
First, if a court awarding a divorce decree does not have personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse, that spouse can collaterally
attack the court's finding that the petitioning spouse was a domi-
ciliary.15 The divorce decree constitutes a conclusive adjudication
of all facts except jurisdictional facts, and domicile is a jurisdic-
tional fact.18 Therefore, although the collateral attack is not aimed
expressly at nullifying the divorce decree, a collateral attack has
that practical result.
For example, if a Virginia husband leaves his wife in Virginia,
goes to Nevada exclusively to obtain a divorce, and intends to re-
turn to Virginia immediately thereafter, he neither loses his Vir-
guina domiciliary status nor acquires new domicile in Nevada.17
Consequently, his wife may launch a successful collateral attack in
a Virginia court against the Nevada divorce decree by demonstrat-
ing the fraudulent nature of her husband's purported domicile in
Nevada." The anomalous result is that although each state is em-
powered to grant valid divorce decrees upon finding that one
spouse is domiciled within its boundaries, that decree may be
voided through a collateral attack by the absent spouse, over whom
14. See generally Weintraub, supra note 9, at 967-73.
15. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II). The North Carolina
Supreme Court, upon reviewing the remanded Williams I, see supra note 12, affirmed the
petitioners' convictions of bigamous cohabitation. The United States Supreme Court m 1945
again reviewed petitioners' convictions in Williams H and held that a divorce decree can be
collaterally attacked if the rendering state did not have jurisdiction. 325 U.S. at 229. See
also Esenwem v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
16. 325 U.S. at 232.
17. The Supreme Court stated that the critical element in establishing domicile is the
absence of any intention to live elsewhere. See id. at 236. A short stay in a state is not
necessarily fatal to the existence of domicile; the current intention to stay for an indefinite
length of time is sufficient. See 317 U.S. at 298 n.9. See also 325 U.S. at 236.
18. The wife may attack the Nevada court's assertion of jurisdiction over her husband
notwithstanding that court's express ruling that her husband had acquired domiciliary
status.
As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicile, upon which depends
the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to the exertion of
such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it has a right,
when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or exis-
tence of that crucial fact.
325 U.S. at 230.
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the forum had no personal jurisdiction. 19 Thus, personal jurisdic-
tion over both parties to a divorce proceeding is essential to pre-
vent collateral attacks based on the jurisdictional finding of
domicile.
The divisible divorce doctrine provides a second reason for
favoring judicial exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
spouses in divorce proceedings. This doctrine prohibits the forum
state granting the divorce from determining the absent spouse's
rights to alimony or support unless the forum exercises personal
jurisdiction over that spouse.2 0 The absent spouse's financial inter-
ests are thus protected regardless of the forum state's dissolution
of the marriage.21
Accordingly, a Virginia husband may leave his wife in Virginia
and acquire a valid ex parte divorce m Nevada; however, because
the Virginia wife is not subject to jurisdiction in Nevada, the Ne-
vada court has no power to determine her rights under Virginia
law to financial support.2 2 The divisible divorce doctrine, therefore,
accommodates the interests of both Nevada and Virginia in this
divorce setting: the doctrine gives effect to Nevada's divorce decree
insofar as it alters the marital status, yet the doctrine protects Vir-
ginia's interest in its citizens' welfare by ignoring the decree's ef-
fect on the issues of support and alimony.23 Consequently, the ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse in
divorce cases promotes settlement, in one judicial proceeding, of
both spouses' individual rights and obligations with respect to fu-
ture financial support.
A third reason that a state court should exercise personal juris-
diction over the nonresident spouse in divorce proceedings is to
ensure the binding effect of custody awards. In May v. Anderson,2"
the United States Supreme Court held that a state court may not
19. The Supreme Court suggested that this anomalous situation "is merely one of those
untoward results inevitable in a federal system in which regulation of domestic relations has
been left with the States and not given to the national authority." Id. at 237.
20. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
21. See 334 U.S. at 546.
22. The Virginia court has a legitimate concern m protecting the livelihood and ensuring
the support of its domiciliarnes; otherwise, the abandoned spouse may be left impoverished
to become a public charge. See Newport v. Newport, 219 Va. 48, 245 S.E.2d 134 (1978).
23. 334 U.S. at 549.
24. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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terminate an absent parent's right to the care, custody, manage-
ment, and companionship of minor children unless that court exer-
cises personal jurisdiction over both parents.2 To illustrate, if a
Virginia husband leaves his wife and child in Virginia and obtains
a divorce decree and a child custody decree in Nevada, a Virginia
court would not find this custody decree binding on his wife in
Virginia, because the Nevada court did not obtain personal juris-
diction over the wife. 28 A parent's right to child custody is a per-
sonal right entitled to as much protection as a spouse's right to
financial support;27 consequently, a state must exercise personal ju-
risdiction over both parents to ensure the binding effect of a cus-
tody award.
Moreover, custody decrees are subject to modification, making
their entitlement to full faith and credit tenuous.28 Courts issuing
custody decrees invariably retain the right to modify the decrees
upon a showing of significantly changed circumstances.2 9 Because
the full faith and credit clause 0 requires only that states give a
judgment the same effect as that judgment would have in the state
where the judgment was rendered, most states claim the right to
modify out-of-state custody decrees when they find that circum-
stances have changed since the original judgment.31 Nevertheless
states generally are reluctant to overturn considered custody de-
crees, or those decrees with which they agree.32 Absent changed
25. Id. at 533.
26. In his concurring opinion in Mays, Justice Frankfurter indicated that disregard of
another state's child custody decree is not compelled as a matter of law. Id. at 535 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). In the example given mtext, the Virginia court thus could recognize
the Nevada child custody decree. In contrast, Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Mays, im-
plied that Virgia would be prohibited from recognizing the Nevada child custody decree.
Id. at 536-37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 534. The Court reasoned that the child's domicile was not a determinative
factor m legitimizing custody awards. Consequently, although the child's domicile was the
forum state, the forum did not have the personal jurisdiction necessary to deprive the non-
resident parent of the personal right to immediate possession of the child. Id.
28. See generally Murchson, Jurisdiction Over Persons, Things and Status, 41 LA. L.
REv. 1053, 1122-23 (1981); Wadlington, Domestic Relations, 55 VA. L. REv. 1201, 1204-05
(1969); Weintraub, supra note 8, at 972.
29. See Murchison, supra note 28, at 1077.
30. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
31. Murchison, supra note 28, at 1077. See also Wadlington, supra note 28, at 1205.
32. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DomzsTIc RELATIONs 325 (1968); Murchison, supra note 28 at
1123. See also Weintraub, supra note 9, at 972. Courts generally determine the existence of
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circumstances requiring custody 'modification to protect the child,
a custody decree issued by a court exercising personal jurisdiction
over both parents presumably would be viewed as a considered
custody decree, because all parties subject to the decree had the
opportunity to disclose the facts necessary to reach a just
determination.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA)s provides a fourth reason for preferring the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident spouses in domestic rela-
tions litigation. URESA enables a spouse to collect child support
payments from a nonresident spouse by authorizing a "two-state
suit" procedure.3 4 Pursuant to URESA, a custodial Virginia parent
may file a petition in Virginia (the initiating state) to secure child
support payments from an absent parent who left Virginia to avoid
such payments. This petition is mailed to the state where the ab-
sent parent resides (the responding state). Under URESA, the re-
sponding state exercises personal jurisdiction over that parent,
grants him a hearing, and is empowered to collect any money due
to the family in the initiating state.
The parent in the responding state, however, may have moved to
that state because of its lenient child support laws, and he may
invoke these laws at his hearing to reduce or renounce the support
payments.3 5 Nevertheless, if the responding state has adopted the
jurisdiction before they examine the merits of a case. In custody cases, however, courts tend
first to determine the merits of the case by considering which forum will best protect the
child's interest. Courts then justify their exercise of jurisdiction by marshalling whatever
jurisdictional contacts exist with the forum in the particular situation. See H. CLARK, supra,
at 320. Upon review of these custody decrees by other forums, the decision to enforce the
decree will depend upon several factors: whether the reviewing court is satisfied with the
original disposition of the case; whether a party to the litigation wrongfully violated the
original custody order and now is asking the court to enforce that violation; and whether the
child's welfare, in light of changed circumstances, reqwres that the original custody order be
modified. Id. at 325.
33. 9A UNiIORM LAWS ANN. 647 (West 1979). This Act, or one substantially similar in
nature, has been passed in all fifty states, the organized territories, and the District of Co-
lumbia. Id. at 748. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 20-88.12 through 20-88.31 (1975).
34. See Note, Securing Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents in Spousal and Child
Support Suits: Is California's Long-Arm Too Short?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. Rxv. 895, 907-08
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Securing Personal Jurisdiction]; Comment, Enforcement of
Child Support Obligations of Absent Parents-Social Services Amendments of 1974, 30
Sw. L.J. 625, 629-31 (1976).
35. See Securing Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 34, at 908.
19831 235
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1958 URESA amendments,36 the initiating state's support order
will bind the responding state if the former has a long-arm statute
authorizing personal jurisdiction.3 7 Thus, the existence of domestic
relations long-arm legislation iir the initiating state is a critical fac-
tor in obtaining support payments under URESA3
Similarly, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner,"9 a state court's ability to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse is essential if the resident
spouse seeks a valid money judgment entitled to full faith and
credit. Prior to Shaffer, courts permitted a plaintiff who was una-
ble to obtain personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant to ob-
tain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on any property located in the
forum owned by the defendant.40 Typicall , plaintiff attached de-
fendant's property, adjudicated the- claim, and then applied the
proceeds of the judicial sale of the property to his claim. Courts
allowed this practice even though plaintiff's claim against the de-
fendant did not concern the attached property41
The decision in Shaffer, however, eliminated quasi in rem juris-
diction unless the plaintiff's claim related directly to the defen-
dant's property. Following Shaffer, courts evaluated all jurisdic-
tional assertions according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington42 and its progeny Accord-
ingly, a wife who seeks to enforce a support agreement against her
nonresident husband can no longer obtain quasi in rem jurisdic-
36. See Comment, supra note 34.
37. See generally Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 289, 306-07 (1973).
38. Some critics, however, have suggested that URESA makes an expansion of personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents unnecessary because the responding state must exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the resident parent and litigate the support award issue. Unfortu-
nately, the responding state is likely to be less sympathetic to the dependent family than
the initiating state which has a vested interest in the welfare of its residents; hence, the
initiating state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the absent parent is imperative, espe-
cially in light of URESA's 1958 amendments. See generally Securing Personal Jurisdiction,
supra note 34, at 907-08; Comment, supra note 34, at 630-31.
39. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For a more detailed discussion of Shaffer, see infra notes 76-80
and accompanying text.
40. See generally infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For the International Shoe standards, see infra notes 52-58 and
accompanying text.
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tion over him merely by seizing his property located in the forum.
Without the availability of quasi in rem jurisdiction as a method
for facilitating enforcement of support agreements, the importance
of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse is
increased substantially.
Thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
spouse is imperative in domestic relations litigation. In divorce
cases, personal jurisdiction over both spouses cuts off collateral at-
tack on the jurisdictional finding of domicile and ensures that a
valid alimony or support judgment will not be subject to a divisible
divorce doctrine challenge. Similarly, personal jurisdiction over
both parents ensures binding child custody awards, because a par-
ent's right to custody is entitled to at least as much protection as
are financial support rights. Additionally, a spouse's ability to en-
force full support payments under URESA is enhanced substan-
tially through the initiating state's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident spouse. Finally, the Court's interpretation in
Shaffer of quasi in rem jurisdiction necessitates the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse to aid in the en-
forcement of support agreements.
Socio-Economic Policies Highlighting the Need for Domestic
Relatins Long-Arm Legislatin
Several socio-economic policies supplement the judicial and leg-
islative mandates for domestic relations long-arm legislation previ-
ously outlined. These policy considerations include the special inti-
macy of the parent-child relationship, the unique vulnerability of
children, and the strong interest of the forum state in the outcome
of domestic relations litigation.43
The United States Supreme Court consistently has given special
consideration to the intimacy of the parent-child relationship, sug-
gesting that this relationship may have constitutional dimen-
sions.44 In Bellotti v. Baird,5 for example, the Court stated that
"[t]he unique role in our society of the family ... requires that
constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility
43. See generally Securing Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 34, at 901-10.
44. See generally 345 U.S. at 533.
45. 443 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
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to the special needs of parents and children. '46 Because the par-
ent-child relationship is of paramount importance in our law and
our society, states should avoid the due process pitfalls inherent in
child custody and support orders involving nonresident parents.
States with domestic relations long-arm legislation avoid these pit-
falls, because their judgments are more likely to receive full faith
and credit.47
Another policy consideration necessitating domestic. relations
long-arm legislation is the unique vulnerability of children. Chil-
dren often are the mute and involuntary objects of custody and
support decrees, and must rely on one of their parents to judicially
enforce their rights under these decrees. Unfortunately, when the
forum in which the custodial parent brings suit cannot exercise
personal jurisdiction over the absent parent, the custodial parent's
motivation to sue decreases proportionately with the increased
burden of pursuing the suit in a foreign state. The adverse conse-
quences of the decision not to sue then fall upon the innocent and
vulnerable child. In May v. Anderson,8 Justice Frankfurter stated
that the law should reflect the special place in life that children
occupy 49 Domestic relations long-arm legislation promotes Justice
Frankfurter's statement by encouraging parents to pursue enforce-
ment or modification of custody and support decrees within their
domicile, thereby assuaging concerns for children's unique
vulnerability
Furthermore, the strong interest of the forum state in the out-
come of domestic relations litigation is protected by the use of
long-arm statutes in actions against nonresident spouses. Each
state has a paramount interest in the regulation of domestic rela-
tions, including the creation and dissolution of marital status, the
custody and support of children, and the distribution of property
mterests50 The Supreme Court consistently has noted that each
state has legitimate interests in providing for the support of aban-
doned spouses and for the maintenance of children of divorced
46. Id. at 634.
47. See supra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
48. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
49. Id. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. 317 U.S. at 298.
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couples.51 The magnitude of these interests demands that states
provide their residents with an effective forum for domestic rela-
tions litigation. The effectiveness of the forum is enhanced immea-
surably when the court exercises personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent litigants pursuant to long-arm statutes.
DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LONG-ARM
LEGISLATION
Expanding the Permissible Scope of State Junsdiction Over
Nonresidents: International Shoe Through McGee
Despite policy considerations that seemingly demand domestic
relations long-arm legislation, states must be careful not to exceed
due process limitations imposed by the fourteenth amendment. Al-
though the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Internatinal Shoe Co. v. Washington52 suggested that the con-
tours of due process were expansive and limited only by the stan-
dard of reasonableness, recent Court decisions have restricted and
redefined these boundaries. To measure Virginia's long-arm stat-
utes against the elusive due process parameters, the jurisdictional
principles embodied in Internatinal Shoe and its progeny must
be examined.
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court established the gen-
eral criteria for determining whether a state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. In holding that
a Washington court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over a
Delaware corporation, the Court formulated a minimum contacts
test:
[D]ue process requires only that m order to subject a defendant
51. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 547 (1948). In Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290
U.S. 202 (1933), Justice Stone, m his dissent, stated that the support of children is a matter
m which states have a particularly strong interest:
The maintenance and support of children domiciled within a state, like their
education and custody, is a subject in which government itself is deemed to
have a peculiar interest and concern. Their tender years, their inability to pro-
vide for themselves, the importance to the state that its future citizens should
be clothed, nourished and suitably educated, are considerations which lead all
civilized countries to assume some control over the maintenance of mnors.
Id. at 220 (Stone, J., dissenting).
52. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""3
The Court provided several guidelines for determining the exis-
tence of minimum contacts. When the nonresident defendant's ac-
tivities in the forum are continuous, systematic, and give rise to
the present cause of action, minimum contacts ordinarily exist and
justify the forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction.54 Furthermore,
a nonresident defendant's continuous activities in the forum may
be substantial enough to justify the forum's exercise of personal
jurisdiction on a cause of action entirely distinct from the defen-
dant's activities.5 5 In contrast, the casual presence of a defendant
performing a single act or isolated activities in the forum is insuffi-
cient to subject him to a personal suit arising from a cause of ac-
tion unrelated to that activity;56 however, a defendant's single act
in the forum may be sufficient, because of its nature, quality, and
the circumstances of its commission, to create minimum contacts
to support personal jurisdiction in a suit arising from that act.5 7
Finally, a defendant receiving legal benefits and protection from a
forum may be within the jurisdiction of the forum's courts.58
From 1945 through 1958, the Supreme Court applied the expan-
sive reasonableness standard59 to minimum contacts analysis and
established a trend broadening the permissible scope of state
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants. In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,6 the Court held that
53. Id. at 316 (citations omitted). The Court indicated that the minimum contacts test
was neither "mechanical" nor "quantitative." Id. "Whether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Id.
at 319.
54. Id. at 317.
55. Id. at 318.
56. Id. at 317.
57. Id. at 318.
58. Id. at 319.
59. Id. at 317, 320. The Court reasoned that due process requirements are "met by such
contacts of the [defendant] with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the
context of our federal system of government, to require the [defendant] to defend the
particular suit which is brought there." Id. at 317.
60. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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Virginia properly exercised personal jurisdiction over a foreign
mail-order health insurance business that issued policies to Vir-
ginia residents."1 The contractual obligations of the insurance com-
pany to Virginia residents, coupled with Virginia's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens and ensuring the fulfillment of these contractual
obligations, constituted sufficient contacts between the insurer and
Virginia to justify the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction.6 2
In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,63 the Supreme Court
held that the forum state constitutionally could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to enforce a cause of action
nQt arising in the forum and unrelated to the business or activities
of the corporation in the forum." The Court found that the foreign
corporation's activities within the forum represented contacts suffi-
cient to enable the forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
corporation consistent with the reasonableness standards outlined
in Internatinal Shoe.6 5
Finally, the Court in McGee v. Internatinal Life Insurance
Co. 6 6 further expanded the boundaries of due process. In this deci-
sion involving a suit by an insurance policy beneficiary against a
nonresident insurer, the Court permitted the forum to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over the insurer despite very attenuated contacts
with the forum. The insurer maintained no office or agent in the
forum and, except for the contract upon which plaintiff sued, had
never solicited nor transacted any business in the forum.6 7 Never-
theless, the Court held that due process concerns had been satis-
fied because the suit arose from a contract having a substantial
connection with the forum. Factors cited as supporting this finding
61. Id. at 649.
62. Id. at 648. Additionally, the Court noted the unfairness and injustice of requiring
local policy holders to seek redress in the distant state in which the insurance company was
incorporated. Id. at 649.
63. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
64. Id. at 446. The Court also stated that the forum was not constitutionally compelled
to exercise personal jurisdiction if local laws prohibited jurisdiction. Id.
65. Id. at 445. The Court maintained that the mininmum contacts determination turned
on the facts of each case. In Perkins, a-corporate officer conducted a continuous and system-
atic supervision of corporate activities within the forum and enjoyed legal benefits and pro-
tection provided by the forum. Id. at 447, 448.
66. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
67. Id. at 222.
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of a substantial connection included the contract's delivery in the
forum, the mailing of the premiums from the forum, the insured's
residence in the forum when he died, and the forum's manifest in-
terest in providing effective redress for its residents when insurers
refused to pay claims.68
The analysis in McGee encouraged state courts to view due pro-
cess in jurisdictional cases as an extraordinarily expansive princi-
ple that eventually would permit limitless jurisdiction over nonres-
idents. In less than a year, however, the Supreme Court in Hanson
v. Denckla69 provided an important counterweight to the expansive
implications of McGee. Hanson commenced a new trend of defin-
Ing and delimiting the scope of jurisdictional due process.
Delimiting the Permissible Scope of State Jurisdiction Over
Nonresidents: Hanson Through Rush
In 1958, the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla retreated
from the expansive implications of McGee and began to impose
definitive limits on state judicial assertions of jurisdiction.70 In
Hanson, the Florida executrix of an estate brought suit in that fo-
rum against a Delaware corporation that had executed a trust
agreement with plaintiff's testatrix while the latter resided in
Pennsylvania.7 The testatrix subsequently moved to Florida and
remained there until her death.72 The Delaware corporation's only
contacts with Florida consisted of transacting "several bits of trust
68. Id. at 223. Furthermore, the Court examined and justified the "clearly discernable"
trend toward expanding the scope of state jurisdiction over nonresidents:
In part this [expansion of jurisdiction over nonresidents] is attributable to the
fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today
many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve par-
ties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of
commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by
mail across state lines. At the same time modern transporation and communi-
cations have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself
in a State where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 222-23.
69. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
70. See Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process,
54 NomE DAmE LAw. 587, 588 (1979).
71. 357 U.S. at 238.
72. Id. at 239.
[Vol. 24:229
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LONG-ARM LEGISLATION
administration" and remitting the trust income to the settlor.75 In
rejecting Florida's claim of personal jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent corporation, the Supreme Court formulated "purposeful
availment" criteria for determining whether the minimum contacts
required by Internatinal Shoe existed:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but
it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the ben-
efits and protections of its laws.7 4
Thus, the Court initiated a trend toward restricting states' exercise
of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants through its
fundamental reinterpretation of International Shoe's minimum
contacts testy5
Similarly, in Shaffer v. Heitner," e the Supreme Court held that
Delaware could not exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident of-
ficers of a Delaware corporation. 7 In Shaffer, the Delaware Corpo-
ration was headquartered in Arizona and had engaged m activities
in Oregon that subjected the corporation to criminal and civil anti-
trust penalties; the plaintiffs in Delaware sought to recover dam-
73. Id. at 252. The Court noted that the nonresident defendant had no office in Florida,
transacted no business in Florida, and never solicited any business in Florida; furthermore,
no trust assets were ever held or administered in Florida. Id. at 251.
74. Id. at 253. The Court stated that the previous trend toward expansion of state court
jurisdiction over nonresidents did not herald the eventual demise of all restrictions on the
exercise of jurisdiction. These restrictions represented more than a guarantee of immunity
from inconvenient or distant litigation; they flowed from territorial limitations on the pow-
ers of the states. Id. at 251. Consequently, a state did not acquire jurisdiction merely by
being the most convenient location for litigation. Id. at 254.
75. The Court distinguished McGee from Hanson. In McGee, the Court found the con-
tractual transaction to have a substantial connection with the forum because it was solic-
ited, accepted, and executed in the forum; consequently, the forum had an interest in pro-
viding effective redress for its residents. In contrast, Hanson involved the validity of an
agreement into which the parties entered without regard to the forum. Id. at 252.
76. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For further discussion of Shaffer, see supra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
77. Id. at 216.
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ages to the corporation resulting from these activities.78 The Court
stated that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the nonresident
corporate officers had the requisite minimum contacts with Dela-
ware. Furthermore, the Court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the
defendants, in accepting positions as officers of a Delaware corpo-
ration, had "purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of
conducting activities" in Delaware."e The Court refused to inter-
pret the defendants' mere acceptance of corporate directorships as
an implied consent to jurisdiction on any cause of action, because
the corporate officers had no reason to expect to be haled before a
Delaware court.8 0
In Kulko v. Superor Court of California,"' the Supreme Court
held that California could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident parent in a child custody and support suit, because
sufficient contacts did not exist between the nonresident parent
and the forum. 2 Mr. and Mrs. Kulko maintained a marital domi-
cile in New York and were the parents of a son and daughter.8 s
After agreeing to a separation, Mrs. Kulko moved to California
while Mr. Kulko remained in New York. 4 The Kulkos drafted and
executed a separation agreement in New York. 5 This agreement
stated that the children would remain with their father during the
school year and spend vacations with their mother, and it also stip-
ulated the amount of child support payments that the father
would provide. 88 After executing the agreement in New York, Mrs.
78. Id. at 190.
79. Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). The Court's con-
clusion seemed to discount the strong interest of Delaware in supervising the management
of Delaware corporations, the intimate role of Delaware law in regulating the obligations of
Delaware corporations, and the substantial benefits that corporate officers received under
Delaware laws. See td. at 214.
80. Id. at 216. The Court expressly noted, however, that Delaware, unlike some states,
had no statute treating acceptance of a corporate directorship as consent to jurisdiction. Id.
Such a law arguably would have provided the mnimum contacts required under Interna-
tional Shoe, because the state's interest in resolving this type of dispute would have been
explicit and the defendants would have been on notice that they were subject to personal
jurisdiction in the forum.
81. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
82. Id. at 92-93.
83. Id. at 86-87.
84. Id. at 87.
85. Id. Mrs. Kulko returned to New York from California to execute the agreement. Id.
86. Id.
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Kulko obtained an ex parte Haitian divorce decree incorporating
the terms of the separation agreement, and then she returned to
California.8 7 Almost one year later, Mr. Kulko permitted his
daughter to move to California and live with her mother during the
school year, and he paid for her trip to California.88 Approximately
two years later, the son, without Mr. Kulko's knowledge or permis-
sion, also joined his mother in California. 9 Shortly therafter, Mrs.
Kulko commenced an action in California seeking to establish the
Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, to obtain full cus-
tody of the children, and to increase Mr. Kulko's child support
payments.90
The United States Supreme Court held that Mr. Kulko's con-
tacts with California were inadequate for California to exercise
personal jurisdiction. In merely acqmescing to his daughter's desire
to live in California with her mother and in purchasing her plane
ticket, Mr. Kulko did not perform a "purposeful act" constituting
a minimum contact with California.9' He could not reasonably
have foreseen that allowing his daughter to join her mother in Cal-
ifornia would subject him to personal jurisdiction in California:
"[tihis single act is surely not one that a reasonable parent would
expect to result in the substantial financial burden and personal
strain of litigating a child support suit in a forum 3,000 miles
away.19 2 Mr. Kulko also did not purposefully derive benefits from
the forum as a result of his activities; public services provided by
the forum accrued to the benefit of the children, not the father.93
Moreover, any diminution in Mr. Kulko's household expenses re-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 88.
90. Id.
91. The Court stated: "A father who agrees, m the interests of family harmony and his
children's preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than was required
under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have 'purposefully availed himself' of
the 'benefits and protections' of California's laws." Id. at 94.
92. Id. at 97. The Court emphasized that California had enacted no specific long-arm
statute authorizing jurisdiction covering tis set of facts. Such a statute would have evi-
denced California's particularized interest in adjudicating this case. Id. at 98. Additionally,
such a statute arguably would have tipped the scales in favor of recognizing the existence of
the nmmum contacts required under International Shoe by making California a foresee-
able forum for this litigation. See id.
93. Id. at 94 n.7.
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sulted not from his children's presence in California, but in their
absence from his home. 4
In January 1980, the Supreme Court decided its most recent ju-
risdictional cases. In both World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son s and Rush v. Savchuck,96 the Court again prevented states
from exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendants because
of the paucity of contacts between the defendants and the forums.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, plaintiff initiated a products liability
action in an Oklahoma court against a nonresident car retailer and
its wholesale distributor.97 The defendants' only connection with
Oklahoma was the fact that a car they sold in New York to a New
York resident became involved in an accident in Oklahoma.9" The
Court found that this connection was insufficient to establish the
requisite minimum contacts between the forum and the defendant,
and held that the Oklahoma court could not exercise personal ju-
risdiction over the defendants. 9 Similarly, in Rush, the Court held
94. Id. at 95. The Court stated that California's reliance on the "effect" test for asserting
jurisdiction was misplaced. The "effect" test-examining a party's activity to see if it caused
an effect in the forum-historically has been used to justify the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants whose wrongful activity outside the forum caused injury
within the forum, or whose commercial activity affected forum residents. Id. at 96 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 37 (1971)). This cause of action arose from
neither of these situations, but rather from Mr. Kulko's private and personal domestic rela-
tions. Id. at 97.
Mrs. Kulko asserted that California had a substantial interest in protecting its minor re-
sidents' welfare. Although agreeing, the Court noted that these interests were factors in
choice of law, not jurisdictional, questions. Id. at 98. Additionally, the state had not enacted
a long-arm statute and thus had not exhibited a particularized interest in such cases. Id.
Finally, California's interest in its young residents' welfare was served adequately by the
state's participation in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968
(RURESA). Id. at 98-99.
95. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
96. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
97. 444 U.S. at 288.
98. Id. at 289.
99. Id. at 298-99. The Court identified factors important in determining whether a non-
resident defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum to warrant the forum's exercise of
personal jurisdiction:
The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is
"reasonable to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which
is brought there." Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the under-
standing that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern,
will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, in-
cluding the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's
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that a Minnesota court could not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant merely by attaching the contractual
obligation of his insurer who was licensed to do business in the
forum. 100 The Court stated that the presence of defendant's insurer
in Minnesota in itself did not constitute sufficient contacts be-
tween defendant and Minnesota.101
Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated that due process sub-
stantially limits the ability of state courts to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants, because due process requires mini-
mum contacts between the defendant, the forum, and the cause of
action.102 A distillation of Supreme Court decisions suggests that
three broad factors should be considered m determining the limits
of due process: the purposefulness of the defendant's conduct ei-
ther within or affecting the forum; the foreseeability of a suit in
the forum; and the nature and extent of the forum's interest in the
litigation. 03
Virginia's domestic relations long-arm statutes must be analyzed
in light of these factors. The contours of due process admittedly
are elusive because the minimum contacts test requires considera-
tion of a number of factors, no one of which is controlling. 04 Nev-
ertheless, an analysis is imperative because recent Supreme Court
decisions indicate that due process imposes strict limitations on
the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents. Consequently, Vir-
ginia's long-arm statutes must be examined to ensure that their
jurisdictional reach does not exceed their due process grasp.
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief ., the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and
the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies.
Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
100. 444 U.S. at 333.
101. Id. at 330. Although the relationship between an insured and his insurer may be
significant in evaluating their ties to a forum, the adventitious ties of either to a forum
cannot automatically be attributed to the other in order to create minimum contacts; the
requirements of International Shoe must be met independently as to each defendant over
whom a forum seeks to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 328-29.
102. 433 U.S. at 204.
103. See Securing Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 34, at 899. See also supra note 99
and accompanying text.
104. See 436 U.S. at 92.
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ANALYZING VIRGINIA'S DoMEsTIc RELATIONS LONG-ARM STATUTES
Section 8.01-328.1.A(8)
Prior to the 1978 enactment of Virginia's first domestic relations
long-arm statute, jurisdiction over nonresidents involved in domes-
tic relations litigation arguably could have been squeezed, through
creative advocacy, into the "business, '10 5 "contract," 10 6 or "tort '1 20 7
provisions of Virginia's long-arm statutes.108 The Virginia Assem-
bly recognized, however, that creative advocacy is not always relia-
ble advocacy; the unique policy considerations inherent in family
law litigation demanded a special long-arm statute.
Consequently, the Virginia Assembly enacted section 8.01-
328.1.A(8) in 1978. This statute, as amended in 1982, provides that
a Virginia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent for causes of action arising from that individual's
[h]aving executed an agreement in this Commonwealth which
obligates the person to pay spousal support or child support to a
domiciliary of this Commonwealth, or to a person who has satis-
fied the residency requirements in suits for annulments or di-
vorce for members of the armed forces pursuant to § 20-97 or
having been ordered to pay spousal support or child support
pursuant to an order entered by any court of competent jurisdic-
tion in this Commonwealth having in personam jurisdiction over
such person. 109
This statute, in addition to promoting the special socio-economic
considerations inherent in domestic relations litigation, 1 0 also re-
sponds to two recent judicial and legislative developments affecting
family litigation. The statute enhances Virginia's ability to enforce
support payments under URESA,111 and also authorizes Virginia to
exercise jurisdiction over some absent spouses that Shaffer other-
wise would have prevented. 11 2
105. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(1) (1977).
106. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(2) (1977).
107. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(3) (1977).
108. See generally Weintraub, supra note 9, at 973.
109. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(8) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42 & 76-81.
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In conforming to the recently delimited contours of due pro-
cess, 113 section 8.01-328.1.A(8) requires that the nonresident defen-
dant have substantial contacts with the forum. These contacts in-
clude requiring the nonresident to have executed a support
agreement in Virginia. 114 Presumably, this criterion includes oral
as well as written agreements.11 5 If the agreement is written, the
nonresident defendant has established a connection with Virginia
because he has exhibited an irrebutable purposefulness of con-
duct.1 ' If the agreement is oral, defendant's purposefulness of con-
duct is manifest through his actions, because an oral agreement
remains unexecuted absent both parties' performance.1
Moreover, the nonresident defendant invokes the benefits and
protections of Virginia's laws when executing an agreement in Vir-
ginia, because an agreement defines and thus limits the scope of
his liability 118 If the obligee breaches a support agreement by tak-
ing or demanding more than the agreement provides, the obligor
may invoke the protection of Virginia law by enforcing the agree-
ment m a Virginia court. Similarly, if the obligor breaches the
agreement, the obligee should be able to invoke the protection of
Virginia law and not be forced to suffer the financial and personal
burdens of suing in a foreign forum. Thus, requiring that the
agreement giving rise to the cause of action be executed in Virginia
establishes a substantial connection between the defendant, the fo-
rum, and the litigation.1
113. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
114. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(8) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
115. In the absence of a statute requiring that a contract be reduced to writing, a con-
tract containing the elements essential to the formation of a valid contract is binding even if
a writing is lacking. See United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 571
F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Harris v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 172 Va. 111, 200 S.E. 652
(1939); Central Lunatic Asylum v. Flanagan, 80 Va. 110 (1885).
116. Executing the agreement in Virginia thus complies with the "purposeful availment"
criteria articulated in Hanson: "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails [hin]self of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 357 U.S. at 253.
117. See Harris v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 172 Va. 111, 200 S.E. 652 (1939).
118. See supra note 116.
119. The Supreme Court in Shaffer stated that a central concern of the inquiry into
personal jurisdiction is "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion." 433 U.S. at 204. Additionally, the Court consistently has required that an agreement
giving rise to a cause of action have a connection with the forum. See, e.g., Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court of California, 436 U.S. at 97; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 251.
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Additionally, the likelihood of a suit in Virginia based on an
agreement executed in Virginia is foreseeable. In determining
whether a forum may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant, the Supreme Court repeatedly has examined
whether the defendant reasonably could anticipate being haled
into court in that forum.120 This aspect of the due process analysis
lends a degree of predictability to the legal system in allowing po-
tential defendants to structure their conduct with some assurance
as to where that conduct may render them liable to suit. 21 Section
8.01-328.1.A(8), in requiring that the support agreement be exe-
cuted in Virginia, provides predictability because it requires that
the defendant perform a purposeful act in the forum, that defen-
dant avail himself of the benefits of the laws of the forum, and that
the agreement have a substantial connection with the forum.
Hence, Virginia is a reasonably foreseeable forum for a suit arising
from the agreement.
The Supreme Court also has suggested that the existence of
long-arm statutes in a forum may contribute toward creating mini-
mum contacts between the forum and a nonresident.1 22 A particu-
larized long-arm statute evinces an express interest in adjudicating
certain cases in which the forum has a pressing interest. Virginia
has a paramount socio-economic interest in exercising jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants included in section 8.01-328.1.A(8). 123
120. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court stated that the foreseeability criti-
cal to due process analysis is satisfied when "the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."
444 U.S. at 297.
121. Id.
122. In Kulko, the Supreme Court stated that California had a substantial interest in
protecting resident children and facilitating child-support actions on behalf of resident chil-
dren. Nevertheless, the Court held that California did not provide a fair forum in this case
because, among other reasons, "California [had] not attempted to assert any particularized
interest m trying such cases in its courts by, e.g., enacting a special jurisdictional statute."
436 U.S. at 98. Similarly, in Shaffer the Court stated that "[i]f Delaware perceived its inter-
est in securing jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we
would expect it to have enacted a statute more clearly designed to protect that interest."
433 U.S. at 214-15.
123. This statute limits its protection to obligees in whom Virginia has a manifest inter-
est, namely domiciliaries and persons who have satisfied the residency requirements of § 20-
97. Section 20-97 provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section only, if a member of the armed forces of the
United States has been stationed in this State and has lived with ins or her
250 [Vol. 24:229
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Coupled with the foreseeability of litigation in Virginia engendered
by the statute, this expressed jurisdictional interest itself contrib-
utes toward establishing Virginia as a fair forum for resolving do-
mestic relations disputes between its citizens and nonresident
defendants.
Section 8.01-328.1.A(8), therefore, extends Virginia's exercise of
personal jurisdiction to a party who executes a support agreement
while residing in Virginia and then leaves the state, as well as to a
party who resides outside Virginia, returns to Virginia for the sole
purpose of signing an agreement, and leaves immediately thereaf-
ter.124 In so doing, the statute conforms to the contours of jurisdic-
tional due process because it requires a sufficient number of rele-
vant contacts between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation
to satisfy the minimum contacts test of International Shoe. Thus,
the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to section 8.01-328.1.A(8) over
a nonresident defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 125
The Virginia Assembly, however, in enunciating in section 8.01-
328.1.A(8) the required contacts with such particularity, may have
shortened unnecessarily the reach of this long-arm statute. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia in
Darden v. Heck's, Inc.1 26 stated:
spouse for a period of six months or more in this State next preceding a sepa-
ration between such parties, and such service person and spouse continue to
live in this State until and at the time a suit for divorce or legal separation is
commenced, then such person and his or her spouse shall be presumed to be
domiciled in and to have been a bona fide resident of this State during such
period of time.
VA. CODE § 20-97 (1975).
124. For example, a Virginia husband leaves his wife in Virginia and becomes a Califor-
ma domiciliary, and his wife then drafts a support agreement to which the husband agrees.
If the husband returns to Virginia, signs the agreement, and immediately returns to Califor-
nia, he has placed himself within the reach of Virginia's long-arm statute for causes of ac-
tion arising from that agreement. Because he executed the agreement in Virginia, that
agreement itself establishes his substantial connection with the forum. Moreover, his return
to Virgia to sign the agreement constituted a purposeful act whereby he invoked the pro-
tection of Virginia's laws. Additionally, the spouses' bilateral execution of the agreement m
Virginia makes the Commonwealth a fair and foreseeable forum for litigating actions arising
from that agreement. Finally, § 8.01-328.1.A(8) evinces Virginia's particularized interest in
adjudicating this case, as well as enhancing the foreseeability of litigating in Virginia.
125. See 326 U.S. at 316.
126. 459 F Supp. 727 (W.D. Va. 1978).
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[E]xcept where the General Assembly has placed explicit affirm-
ative limitations on the extent of long-arm jurisdiction in Vir-
ginia, as it has in subsections A.4 and A.5 of § 8.01-328.1, the
courts of Virginia may take personal jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants under each of the subsections of § 8.01-328.1
to the extent allowed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.1 1
7
Subsections A(4) and A(5) are distinguishable substantively from
A(8) because they deal with "tortious injury" and "breach of war-
ranty" respectively; 12s however, these three subsections are similar
in specifying with particularity the required contacts between the
defendant and the forum. Consequently, "insistence that these
particulars be satisfied even in those situations where it could
plausibly be argued that a lesser standard would meet due process
requirements is a course mandated by legislative judgment."' 2 9 As
a result, Virginia courts may not exercise jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant who fails to comply with the specific criteria set
out in subsection A(8), notwithstanding the existence of minimum
contacts under International Shoe. °30
127. Id. at 731-32 (citations omitted).
128. Subsection A(4) authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident as to a cause of action
arising from that person's "[c]ausmg tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or
omision outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, m this Commonwealth "VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(4)
(1977).
Similarly, subsection A(5) authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident as to a cause of ac-
tion arising from that person's
[c]ausing injury in this Commonwealth to any person by breach of warranty
expressedly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this Commonwealth
when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods in this Commonwealth, provided that he also regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services ren-
dered in this Commonwealth
VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(5) (1977).
129. Willes v. Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, 441 F Supp. 1235, 1243 (E.D. Va. 1977). The
court in Willes stated that when the legislature has enacted a long-arm statute, even though
the statute may not extend to the limits of due process, the courts of that state may not go
further and assert jurisdiction over nonresidents not embraced within that statute. Id.
130. For example, a Virginia wife's nonresident husband could travel to Virginia to nego-
tiate a support agreement with his wife. After both parties agreed to the support terms, the
wife would sign the support agreement. The nonresident husband, familiar with the require-
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Arguably, the specific criteria enumerated in § 8.01-328.1.A(8) do
not represent legislative limitations on the reach of Virginia's juris-
dictional powers under this long-arm statute. The Virginia Su-
preme Court stated that the purpose of Virginia's long-arm statute
is to support assertions of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
to the full extent consistent with due process, especially over non-
residents engaged in some purposeful activity in the state who
have incurred obligations to Virginia residents.131 The Virginia Su-
preme Court derived this statement of the statute's purpose di-
rectly from the legislative history accompanying the statute.13 2 Ad-
ditionally, since 1978 the Virginia Assembly has progressively
broadened the scope of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents
in domestic relations litigation. This trend indicates that the stat-
ute's criteria do not represent a legislative attempt to delimit the
outer boundaries of jurisdiction; rather, these criteria represent a
checklist of typical circumstances within due process limits in
which jurisdiction over the absent party exists.133
Section 8.01-328.1.A(8) should be construed and applied com-
mensurately with the limits of due process; the policy considera-
tions inherent in domestic relations reinforce this conclusion.134 Al-
though nothing in the wording of the statute prevents an expansive
construction, a supplemental statutory provision expressly constru-
ing this statute as broadly as due process principles permit would
ensure that legislative intent is effectuated and that the important
ment in subsection A(8) that the agreement be executed in Virginia, could attempt to evade
the reach of this long-arm statute by refusing to sign the agreement until his lawyer, located
in another forum, had examined the agreement. In this situation, the support agreement
would have been negotiated, drafted, and signed by one party in Virginia; however, the non-
resident husband, using the pretext that his lawyer should have an opportunity to review
the agreement, would sign the agreement outside Virginia. Conceivably, this fact pattern or
a similar one could satisfy the mmnum contacts test of International Shoe and thereby
justify Virgia's constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident hus-
band. Under subsection A(8), however, Virginia may be unable to exercise jurisdiction, be-
cause of the husband's clever circumvention of the specific prerequisites set out in that
subsection.
131. John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667
(1971); Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707 (1968).
132. 441 F. Supp. at 1243.
133. See generally Weintraub, supra note 9, at 975.
134. For a discussion of these important policy considerations, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 33-49 & 76-80.
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policy considerations of domestic relations litigation are fulfilled.135
Otherwise, the anomalous situation might arise wherein a nonresi-
dent defendant in a Virginia domestic relations suit may have suf-
ficient minimum contacts for Virginia constitutionally to exercise
jurisdiction, but he nevertheless could evade the grasp of Virginia's
long-arm statute through intentional manipulation of the criteria
in section 8.01-328.1.A(8).13 Such a result defeats the statute's es-
sential purpose. The Virginia Assembly can avoid this situation by
amending section 8.01-328.1.A to read: "A court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction commensurate with the federal constitutional
limits of due process over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a cause of action arising from that person's "1137
Section 8.01-328.1.A(9)
The Virginia Assembly enacted section 8.01-328.1.A(9) in
1981.18' This statute, as amended in 1982, provides in pertinent
part that a Virginia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from that person's
[h]avmg maintained within this Commonwealth a matrimonial
135. See supra notes 33-49 & 76-80 and accompanying text.
136. The Supreme Court in Kulko stated that the mmnum contacts test is not suscep-
tible to mechanical application: "[T]he facts of each case must be weighed to determine
whether the requisite 'affiliating circumstances' are present. We recognize that this determi-
nation is one in which few answers will be written 'in black and white. The greys are domi-
nant, and even among them the shades are innumerable'" 436 U.S. at 92 (citations
omitted).
Similarly, through amendments broadening the scope of Virginia's domestic relations
long-arm statutes, the Virginia Assembly demonstrated its realization that the answers to
domestic relations jurisdictional questions are not written in "black and white." Therefore,
the reach of this statute should not be limited to rigid "black and white" criteria; rather,
domestic relations long-arm statutes must be construed commensurately with due process
limits.
137. A provision substantially similar to this proposed amendment will be introduced to
the 1983 session of the Virginia Assembly. See supra note 1. This amendment also will
lengthen the reach of subsections A(4) and A(5) as currently construed by federal courts in
Virginia. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. Should the legislature decide to
expressly circumscribe the reach of these subsections, an appropriate caveat to their text
could be added. Alternatively, a caveat could be added to § 8.01-328.1.A(9) reading: "Sub-
sections A(S) and A(9) authorize personal jurisdiction commensurate with the federal con-
stitutional limits of due process."
138. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(9) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
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domicile at the time of separation of the parties upon which
grounds for divorce or separate maintenance is based, or at the
time a cause of action arose for divorce or separate maintenance
or at the tine of commencement of such suit, if the other party
to the matrimonial relationship resides herein 139
Section 8.01-328.1.A(9) authorizes Virginia courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse in certain divorce and
separate maintenance suits. These suits thus will not be vulnerable
to collateral attack based on Virginia's jurisdictional finding of
domicile. 14 0 Furthermore, support awards 141 and custody awards14 2
incident to these suits will be entitled to full faith and credit. This
statute also demonstrates the Virginia Assembly's concern for the
socio-economic realities of domestic relations litigation.143
Like section 8.01-328.1.A(8), this statute ensures compliance
with due process safeguards by providing a checklist of typical cir-
cumstances within due process limits in which jurisdiction over the
absent party exists. Virginia may exercise personal jurisdiction
over an absent spouse in a divorce or separate maintenance suit
provided that one party to the suit is a Virginia resident and that
the parties maintained a matrimonial domicile in Virginia when
the cause of action arose or when the suit actually commenced.144
As in section 8.01-328.1.A(8), the existence of these specifically
enumerated circumstances ensures that minimum contacts will ex-
ist among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.245
By maintaining a matrimonial domicile in Virginia, the nonresi-
dent spouse commits a purposeful act wherein he avails himself of
the privilege of conducting domestic activities in the forum, "thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. 1 "4' Either spouse
may invoke the protection of Virginia's domestic relations laws
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 50 & 51.
144. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(9) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
145. See 433 U.S. at 204. For a summary of factors that courts apply in determining the
sufficiency of contacts, see supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., 357 U.S. at 253. Virginia provides the marred couple with the benefits of,
inter alia, a state judicial system, police and fire protection, a school system, hospital ser-
vices, recreational facilities, libraries, and museums. See 436 U.S. at 94 n.7.
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while maintaining a matrimonial domicile in Virginia; a husband
abandoning his wife should not be allowed to terminate unilater-
ally and automatically her protection under these laws.
Section 8.01-328.1.A(9) also ensures that the absent spouse rea-
sonably can anticipate Virginia's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over him in a divorce or separate maintenance suit.147 In requiring
the existence of a marital domicile within the forum at the time a
cause of action arises or a suit actually commences, 48 the statute
ensures that the absent spouse has a substantial and purposeful
connection with the forum. This connection secures a correlative
connection between the litigation and the forum, thereby making
Virginia a fair and foreseeable forum for litigating a divorce or sep-
arate maintenance suit. 49 Moreover, the very existence of this
long-arm statute not only announces Virginia's particularized in-
terest in litigating these cases, 5 ' but also enhances the foreseeabil-
ity of such litigation in Virginia.
Thus, section 8.01-328.1.A(9) provides specific circumstances in
which Virginia may exercise personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse in a divorce or separate maintenance suit well within the
minimum contacts standard of International Shoe.151 As with sec-
tion 8.01-328.1.A(8), however, the Virginia Assembly may have re-
stricted unnecessarily the reach of this long-arm statute by enunci-
ating with such particularity the prerequisite contacts between the
defendant and the forum. 52 Because the reach of this long-arm
statute should be commensurate with the limits of due process, the
express statutory provision previously recommended to broaden
147. See, e.g., 444 U.S. at 297.
148. VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1.A(9) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
149. The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen indicated that the following rele-
vant factors can be cited to justify and validate § 8.01-328.1.A(9): Virginia's interest m adju-
dicating the dispute; the abandoned spouse's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies. See generally 444 U.S. at 292.
150. See supra notes 80 & 92 and accompanying text.
151. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
152. For example, a husband might bring his wife to Virginia, buy her a home, and im-
mediately thereafter desert her. Even if he continued to live in Virginia, he arguably never
maintained a matrimonial domicile in Virginia consonant with § 8.01-328.1.A(9). Thus,
should his wife initiate divorce proceedings, he could leave Virginia prior to service of pro-
cess and thereby evade the reach and circumvent the purpose of this long-arm statute.
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the scope of section 8.01-328.1.A(8) is also necessary to remedy this
similar defect in section 8.01-328.1.A(9). 153
CONCLUSION
In enacting and amending sections 8.01-328.1.A(8) and (9), the
Virginia Assembly responded to numerous policy considerations
favoring the creation of specific domestic relations long-arm legis-
lation.154 By authorizing Virginia courts to exercise personal juris-
diction over nonresidents in certain family litigation suits, the
General Assembly prevented collateral jurisdictional attack, en-
sured the binding effect of financial settlements and custody agree-
ments, enhanced the enforceability of Virginia court judgments
under URESA, and compensated for the state's diminished ability
under Shaffer to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction.155 Additionally,
these statutes constitute a legislative acknowledgement of the
unique vulnerability of children and the special intimacy existent
in the parent-child relationship. 55 Similarly, these statutes express
the strong interest of the Commonwealth in the outcome of domes-
tic relations litigation.
Although recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that due pro-
cess substantially limits the ability of state courts to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresidents, sections 8.01-328.1.A(8) and
(9) work well within these limits in listing with particularity typi-
cal circumstances that satisfy the minimum contacts requirement
of International Shoe. 57 This listing of typical circumstances,
however, should not be construed as a legislative limit on the reach
of these long-arm statutes. Rather, the Virginia Supreme Court's
expansive construction of Virginia's long-arm legislation, the legis-
lature's broad statement of intent, and the recent liberalizing
amendments to these statutes all indicate that sections 8.01-
328.1.A(8) and (9) should be construed and applied commensu-
rately with the constitutional limits of due process. The policy con-
153. See supra text accompanying note 137.
154. For a discussion of the policy considerations favoring the creation of domestic rela-
tions long-arm legislation, see supra notes 12-51 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 15-42 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
157. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
siderations inherent in domestic relations litigation demand noth-
ing less.
Nevertheless, federal district courts have construed narrowly two
of Virginia's long-arm statutes that provide a particularized listing
of circumstances similar to that of sections 8.01-328.1.A(8) and
(9).158 Under such a narrow construction, a nonresident defendant
could escape the reach of Virginia's domestic relations long-arm
statutes by purposefully failing to comply with the specific criteria
in sections 8.01-328.1.A(8) or (9). This could occur even though the
nonresident defendant's conduct in the forum satisfied the mini-
mum contacts criteria of Internattonal Shoe. Such a result frus-
trates the legislative intent and ignores the policy considerations
underlying these statutes. An amendment to these domestic rela-
tions long-arm statutes mandating expansive construction com-
mensurate with the limits of due process is essential to prevent
this result.159 Moreover, such an amendment would make Vir-
ginia's domestic relations long-arm statutes model legislation for
all states.
E. Roy HAWKENS
158. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
159. See supra text accompanying note 137.
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